Agency and Authenticity by Carrozzo, Christian
AJOB NEUROSCIENCE





MedStar Washington Hospital Center
Within the passages of a laudable attempt to provide
a framework via which some clarity can be brought
to questions regarding the ways in which differing
aspects or “dimensions” of agency are interconnected
and mutually influential, the authors of “Mapping the
Dimensions of Agency” (Sch€onau et al. 2021) make
the claim that, as one of these aspects, a notion of
“(a)uthenticity is central to human agency” (176), and
that the feeling we associate with agency (that our
actions are, indeed, effectual) becomes somewhat illu-
sive and perhaps alienating if our sense of self suffers
from some form of discontinuity in light of this reli-
ance. Facing a problematic concept, the authors do
well to provide a definition of authenticity from
which they construct their framework, i.e., “the ability
to reflect on one’s past, envision one’s future, and
work to align one’s actions with this vision while pre-
serving continuity” (176). Yet, under an embedded
understanding of agency, one that allows for broader
ethical consideration via the inclusion of non-inten-
tional action, it does not require these. Roughly, an
embodied/embedded/enactive account of agency
attaches itself to a long line of reasoning in the phil-
osophy of mind that sees consciousness as part of its
environment, as opposed to a “detached observer”
that operates on its environment, as if individuated
from it (Demski and Garrabrant 2019; Dreyfus 2002).
Indeed, agency does not require a corresponding
mental representation at all, and thus does not
require an experience of authenticity, as defined. That
is, at least as presented, authenticity is not central to
agency when agency is understood as constituted by
both intentional as well as non-intentional causal rela-
tions between agents and events. Certainly, a notion
of authenticity as it relates to conscious experience
will inherently lend itself to ethical considerations.
Nevertheless, a much broader realm of ethical consid-
erations surrounding agency can be realized when
agency is understood as instantiated, even in the
absence of a corresponding mental representation
(i.e., non-intentional). For the purposes of this writ-
ing, I refer to non-intentional actions/effects as those
which cannot be verified to be causally associated
with an appropriately corresponding mental represen-
tation at all (i.e., in the absence of mental representa-
tion), as opposed to unintentional actions/effects,
meaning the effects were simply not anticipated by
the action’s corresponding mental representation.
AGENCY IN THE ABSENCE OF MENTAL
REPRESENTATIONS
Subjectively, our phenomenal sense of agency is said
to be the feeling we experience in our active capacity
to engage in effectual behavior. That experience, that
feeling, is what we can say counts as verification of a
causally appropriate cognitive disposition in relation
to the activity – i.e., the sense that the effects are
indeed the result of our agentive engagement when
accompanied by mental representations that make
appropriate sense of the effects experienced as being
the results of my will to act. For instance, I believe
that my fountain pen has run out of ink, so I pick it
up with the intention to change the cartridge, and do
so. The experienced effects of my action have resulted
in a phenomenal (seeming) confirmation that my
beliefs and intentions are what caused my will to be
effectual via the act of picking up and changing the
cartridge. To be clear, the general approach to agency
that posits appropriate relations of cause and effect as
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verifiable (at least subjectively) between mental repre-
sentations and events is what we might consider the
standard theory of agency.
Theories of consciousness have largely focused on
the idea that our cognitive processes bear represen-
tational content. What some might call a preoccupa-
tion with representationalism as an approach to
studies of consciousness in cognitive science has
been argued as overly detached from the phenomena
in question, and ignorant to the relational dynamics
between our neurologic equipment and the environ-
ment. (For a recent review of the general critique,
see Gallagher 2018). In the context of a discussion
on agency, the general approach fails to capture
important modes of agency that occur in the absence
of corresponding mental representations from which
to gauge something like subjective intention.
Justification for a move away from the standard the-
ory is often expressed as having the aim of including
non-humans in our considerations of agency. This is
not to say that non-human animals are lacking
intention, necessarily (although some argue this on
behalf of the lack of a language ability, since without
language it becomes difficult to see how exactly
non-humans would experience, let alone communi-
cate, something like intention or any representa-
tional state). However, non-intentional acts are the
case for humans, as well – unlike non-human
agency, i.e., clearly not in that we lack the appropri-
ate conceptual language by which to fix and commu-
nicate our subjective experiences, but in that many
of our actions simply occur as a matter of what is
sometimes called “skilled-coping,” or cognitive
habituation (Dreyfus 2002; Hoffding 2014; Schmid
et al. 2014). Habituated actions are those we perform
without any conscious deliberation or reasoning,
such as when we find ourselves immersed in an
activity while in the absence of any relevant reflec-
tion or judgment. Thus, these are actions that occur
without intention, such as the effortless way in
which we operate a vehicle on the road even though
our cognitive reflection and corresponding represen-
tations may be entirely consumed with experiencing
the music that is playing as we drive. To be sure,
my ability to operate a vehicle hasn’t always been
non-intentional. Having this ability indicates on
behalf of the psychological concept of habituation
that I once engaged quite reflectively over the many
learned nuances of operating a vehicle. The point is,
the habituated act is still an instance of causally
effectual and appropriate (the behavioral effect came
from the behavioral cause) agency, even if without
anything like present intention.
BROADENING THE SCOPE OF ETHICAL
ANALYSIS VIA THE RECOGNITION OF NON-
INTENTIONAL AGENCY
Not only can directed action (i.e., in response to the
environment) be exemplified in the absence of corre-
sponding representations, its effects are precisely the
kind we make our object in the moral evaluation of
non-intentional acts. That is, should we define agency
as only including intentional acts, then effect-based
justificatory views like those of consequentialism lose
a good deal of the matters to which they appear to be
the most appropriate theoretical approach, i.e., justifi-
cation based on consequences, either because effects
are all we have available to judge or because the act
was subjectively non-intentional. We need not look
anywhere past our example of the habituated oper-
ation of a vehicle to conjure up a situation in which a
non-intentional act is still one we would be willing to
judge morally had it resulted in ethically objectionable
circumstances. Whether the vehicle’s operator was
reflectively engaged in every single move she made on
the road, or whether we take the cognitive science of
habituation seriously and understand that she was
mostly operating via skilled-coping, we will neverthe-
less judge the operator as a morally responsible agent
should she kill someone on the road via intentional
(representational) or non-intentional (non-representa-
tional) action.
Consequentialist theories are prepared for exactly
the sorts of moral evaluations that might lack, for
various reasons, an intentional component. Claiming
that authenticity, as defined, is central to agency is
claiming that agency requires intention, but as we
can see, requiring that agency require intention disre-
gards an entire realm of human action worthy of
ethical consideration as non-intentional. And without
the recognition of non-intentional agency, how other-
wise are we to adequately judge the moral permissi-
bility of an act in light of nothing but habituation
and consequence? Certainly, if one finds consequen-
tialism to be basically inadequate to ethical evalu-
ation in general, perhaps without knowledge of
intention one might think ethical evaluation simply
cannot occur (a staunch Kantian, perhaps). But, for
any ethicist prepared to adjudicate based on
AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 207
consequences in order to avoid those same effects in
the future (and not in order to judge an individual’s
intentions), moral agency, and thus, agency in gen-
eral, must often be understood as instantiated even
when we don’t have evidence of intention for every
particular action.
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